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1. Introduction: What are Meanings?
The language faculty generates expressions that relate sounds and meanings, but it
is not immediately obvious exactly what kind of formal object “meanings” are. A
common assumption is that sentence meanings are truth conditions: unstructured
functions from worlds to truth values.1 By looking at the relationship between lan-
guage understanding and veriﬁcation procedures, this paper explores the possibility
that a sentence’s meaning could in fact be something strictly richer than a truth con-
dition, which makes reference to certain kinds of algorithms or representations that
may be used to determine the truth value of the sentence in a particular world.
If this possibility is correct, then a sentence’s meaning will give some priv-
ileged status to a subset of the possible veriﬁcation procedures. On the other hand,
if a sentence’s meaning is nothing more than a bare truth condition, then all veriﬁ-
cation procedures implementing the right function from worlds to truth values will
have equal status. We provide evidence that meanings are not veriﬁcation-agnostic
truth conditions, by showing that varying the suitability of a scene to some types
of veriﬁcation procedures affects participants’ accuracy in assigning truth values,
whereas varying the suitability of a scene to some other types veriﬁcation proce-
dures does not.
To address these questionswe investigatedEnglish-speakers’ understanding
of the word most. This was chosen as a starting point because the conventional
truth-conditional semantics of most is relatively well-understood, and there exists a
range of useful ﬁndings concerning the psychology of number and constraints on
visual perception that we can bring to bear on experimental results. But there is no
reason that the same questions we ask about most should not in principle be asked
about any other expression of natural language.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we outline the
space of possible veriﬁcation procedures for sentences of the form Most (of the)
Xs (are) Y, and review some previous work addressing the relationship between
the meaning and veriﬁcation of these sentences. We then present two experiments.
1Or perhaps structured abstracta composed of functions, as in Cresswell (1985), though there
the structure serves only to ensure that complex expressions containing embedded propositions can
have their semantics determined compositionally. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this
structure is “visible” only to the language faculty, for the purposes of determining the semantics of
other linguistic expressions, and that the object delivered to other cognitive faculties is nonetheless
an unstructured truth condition. But of course if evidence is found that sentence meanings have
structure that is visible beyond the language faculty, one might ask if this is “the same structure” as
Cresswell proposes.
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T. Friedman and S. Ito (eds.), SALT XVIII, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. The ﬁrst experiment (in Section 3) indicates that the meaning of most makes refer-
ence to a kind of cardinality concept, contrary to an alternative based on one-to-one
correspondence that otherwise appears likely given the outline in Section 2. After
examining more closely the range of veriﬁcation procedures consistent with these
ﬁndings (Section 4), the second experiment (Section 5) attempts to distinguish be-
tween these more ﬁne-grained possibilities, and asks how the meaning (provided
by the language faculty) of a most sentence interacts with properties of the visual
system which constrain participants’ perception of the relevant cardinalities.
2. Veriﬁcation Procedures for most
2.1. Hackl (in press): most and more than half
Hackl (in press) compares the veriﬁcation procedures employed in determining the
truth of sentences like those in (1) in order to provide evidence for a decision be-
tween which of the statements in (2) better expresses the meaning of (1a).
(1) a. Most of the dots are yellow.
b. More than half of the dots are yellow.
(2) a. |DOT YELLOW| > |DOT YELLOW|
b. |DOT YELLOW| > 1
2|DOT|
Hackl observes differences in behaviourbetween participants who are asked
to determine the truth of a sentence like (1a), and those who are asked to deter-
mine the truth of a sentence like (1b). From this he concludes that, despite the
truth-conditional equivalence of the two expressions in (2), (2a) better expresses
the meaning of (1a): since the meaning of (1b) is clearly best expressed as (2b), and
participants’ understanding of the two sentences led them to different patterns of
behaviour, the best expression of the meaning of (1a) must be something different
from (2b).2
This argument obviously relies on the notion that there is something more
to a meaning than just a truth condition, and that this “something more” is reﬂected
in the veriﬁcation procedures used by speakers to assign truth values to sentences,
as described in Section 1. Under these assumptions, the argument that the meaning
of most differs from that of more than half is convincing, but we can not easily con-
clude with any certainty from Hackl’s results exactly which veriﬁcation procedures
are implicated in the meanings of most and of more than half — only that the two
meanings differ in this respect. Even on the assumption that (2b) in some sense
best expresses the veriﬁcational implications of (1b), it is not clear that (2a) best
2For Hackl, this ﬁnding is one piece of evidence in a larger argument that the meaning of most
differs from that of more than half in that it is constructed compositionally as a superlative expres-
sion. However, the relevant point for our purposes is just that the different veriﬁcation proﬁles of
the two expressions in (1) provided evidence against expressing the meaning of (1a) as (2b).
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condition to consider as possibilities.
2.2. Veriﬁcation without cardinalities
In particular, while both the expressions in (2) make reference to cardinalities, there
exist truth-conditionally equivalent expressions which do not. It is even tempting to
suspect that such expressions might be more accurate representations of the mean-
ing of (1a) than either of those in (2), given the intuition that it is easy to quickly
determine the truth of (1a) in the scene shown in Figure 1 without determining any
cardinalities at all — neither that of the set of all dots, nor the set of yellow dots, nor
the set of blue (or non-yellow) dots. If we believe that the meanings of sentences
inform veriﬁcation procedures, then this might lead us to reject both of the expres-
sions in (2), to the extent that they both imply that a comparison of cardinalities is
required to verify (1a).
Figure 1: Intuitively, it seems to be possible to determine the truth of a sentence
like Most of the dots are yellow without determining any cardinalities at all.
Besides the intuition about scenes like Figure 1, further evidence that most
statements can be veriﬁed without determining cardinalities comes from research
with young children. Halberda et al. (2008) tested three- and four-year-olds’ un-
derstanding of most by asking them to determine the truth of sentences like Most
of the crayons are yellow in scenes like those shown in Figure 2, while varying
the number of crayons of each colour. Crucially, some children of this age (“non-
counters”) have not yet acquired the ability to represent and compare arbitrarily
large integers: their understanding of cardinality does not extend beyond three or
four. At some point in development, a child realises the recursive generalisation
which permits representations of larger integers, and relatively suddenly gains the
ability to represent all the remaining natural numbers (becoming a “full-counter”).
a. b.
Figure 2: Sample stimuli from Halberda et al. (2008), showing the easiest ratio of
set cardinalities, 1:9 (a), and the hardest ratio, 6:7 (b).
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rectly determined the truth of a most sentence as a function of the ratio of the size of
the larger colour-set to the smaller one (“Weber ratio”), for children who were older
than the estimated age of most comprehension in this task (Halberda et al. 2008).
The signiﬁcant point for current purposes is that even the non-counters performed
signiﬁcantly above chance for all but the hardest ratio. These are children that are
unable to determine which of two given integers greater than three is the larger, so
comparison of two cardinalities can not be a part of the veriﬁcation procedure they
are using to verify Most of the crayons are yellow. But they are performing some
veriﬁcation procedure for this sentence which results in above-chance accuracy.
Figure 3: Percentage of responses correct for non-counters and full-counters at
various ratios. Even non-counters perform signiﬁcantly above chance at verifying
most sentences.
2.3. Veriﬁcation using one-to-one correspondence
What sort of veriﬁcation procedure could be used in these cases where cardinal-
ity comparison is not possible, either because the participant is not a full-counter or
because the relevant items are shown too quickly to count? If we consider the math-
ematical foundations of cardinality, then the possibility of a veriﬁcation procedure
based on the notion of one-to-one correspondence presents itself. A common way
to deﬁne cardinality begins by stating that two sets A and B have the same cardinal-
ity if and only if the elements of A can be put in one-to-one correspondence3 with
the elements of B:
(3) |A| = |B|    OneToOne(A,B)
Therefore it is possibleto determine, for example, that the set of yellow dots has the
same cardinality as the set of non-yellow dots, by determining that there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the yellow dots and the non-yellow dots, without
knowing what this shared cardinality is.
3More formally, the elements of A can be put in one-to-onecorrespondencewith the elements of
B if and only if there exists a bijection (a surjective, injective function) with domain A and range B.
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another, via the deﬁnition of the greater-than relation, it follows that (for ﬁnite sets)
thecardinality of a set A is greater than that of a set B if and only if there existssome
proper subset of A, call it A , such that there exists a one-to-one correspondence
between the elements of A  and the elements of B:
(4) |A| > |B|     A [OneToOne(A ,B) and A    A]
For convenience we deﬁne a new relation on sets OneToOnePlus as follows:
(5) OneToOnePlus(A,B)     A [OneToOne(A ,B) and A    A]
and so we have:
(6) |DOT YELLOW| > |DOT YELLOW|
    A [OneToOne(A ,(DOT YELLOW)) and A   (DOT YELLOW)]
   OneToOnePlus(DOT YELLOW,DOT YELLOW)
Therefore it is possible to identify expressions which are truth-conditionally equiv-
alent to those in (2), but which do not make reference to any cardinalities. This
implies that it is possible to determine that the cardinality of the set of yellow dots
is greater than that of the set of non-yellow dots, by recognising that there exists a
one-to-one correspondence between the non-yellow dots and some proper subset of
the yellow dots — again, without ever determining any cardinalities. This situation
is illustrated in Figure 4. Studies of object-tracking competence in infants (Wynn
1992, Feigenson 2005)have revealed a cognitivesystem that can detect therequired
kind of one-to-one correspondences. It is therefore tempting to conclude that when
a child without full numerical competence manages to correctly judge the truth of
a most statement, or when a competent adult does so having glanced at Figure 1 so
quickly that counting is not possible, a veriﬁcation procedure based on one-to-one
correspondence is being used.
Figure 4: Recognising that a proper subset of the yellow dots can be put in one-to-
one correspondence with (all of) the non-yellowdots might permit one to determine
that Most of the dots are yellow is true.
2.4. Veriﬁcation using the Approximate Number System
There is, however, another cognitive system known to psychologists that could per-
mit veriﬁcation procedures for most statements that neither compares cardinalities
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verbal animals an Approximate Number System (ANS) that very quickly (within
150ms of visual stimulus onset (Nieder and Miller 2004)) generates representations
of pluralities in ways that effectively order those pluralities according to cardinal-
ity — albeit stochastically, and within certain limits described by Weber’s Law
(Cordes et al. 2001, Feigenson et al. 2004, Dehaene 1997). Weber’s Law states that
discriminability (for our purposes, the ability to determine which of two ANS rep-
resentations corresponds to the greater cardinality) depends only on the ratio of the
two represented cardinalities.
Figure 5: The representations of the ANS, modelled by a sequence of Gaussian
curves with linearly increasing means and standard deviations.
To model this pattern of discriminability we can consider a “mental num-
ber line” as illustrated in Figure 5. On this view, the “noise” in the representations
increases with the number represented: the ANS representation triggered by the
perception of a set with cardinality n is characterised by a Gaussian curve with
mean n and standard deviation directly proportional to n. The overlap between
any two curves therefore increases linearly with the ratio between the represented
cardinalities, and thus by Weber’s Law acts as a predictor of the difﬁculty of distin-
guishing two representations (and identifying which of the represented cardinalities
is the larger). For example, it is clear from Figure 5 that the curves labelled 8 and
10 overlap to a much greater extent than those labelled 2 and 4, indicating that the
ANS has more difﬁculty distinguishinga set of eight things from a set of ten things,
than it does distinguishing a set of two things from a set of four things. Also, note
that because the ratio of 2 to 4 is the same as the ratio of 4 to 8, the ANS’s ability
to distinguish a set of two things from a set of four things is as good as its ability
to distinguish a set of four things from a set of eight things. The threshold of dis-
criminability (the ratio by which two numbers must differ in order for the ANS to
be able to reliably distinguish their representations) varies from individual to indi-
vidual (Halberda et al. in press) and improves with age (Halberda and Feigenson
in press); but wherever this threshold is, there will exist some cases where it is not
possible to determine the precise cardinality of any sets of dots (because the rele-
vant dots are perceived only very brieﬂy), but where it is nevertheless possible to
determine the truth of Most of the dots are yellow by constructing and comparing
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that of the set of non-yellow dots.
2.5. Summary
To summarise, for the sentence Most of the dots are yellow, we have identiﬁed two
ways to express the relevant truth condition (7) which make reference to different
kindsofformalobjects(setsand cardinalitiesinonecase, andonlysetsintheother),
and three classes of veriﬁcation procedures (8) that could be used to compute the
relevant truth value in a given scenario:
(7) a. |DOT YELLOW| > |DOT YELLOW|
b. OneToOnePlus(DOT YELLOW,DOT YELLOW)
(8) a. Procedures involving computing and comparing precise cardinalities.
b. Procedures involving detecting one-to-one correspondences.
c. Procedures involving generating and comparing ANS representations.
The conventional expression of the relevant truth condition, (7a), suggests
the class of veriﬁcation procedures in (8a), but we have good reason to believe that
some other veriﬁcation procedures exist. The fact that we can express this same
truth condition as (7b) alerts us to the existence of the class of veriﬁcation proce-
dures in (8b). Finally, having noted that the ANS provides a system of representa-
tions that support a stochastic version of the ordering relation that (7a) relies on, we
can identify the class of procedures in (8c): stochastic versions of the comparison-
based procedures in (8a).
In thenext sectionwe present evidencethat when thepossibilityofusingthe
cardinality-basedproceduresof(8a)iseliminated,speakersreverttotheANS-based
procedures of (8c) rather than the correspondence-based procedures of (8b), even
in situationswhich seem to be well-suited to correspondence-based procedures. We
think the strength of this bias against correspondence-based veriﬁcation procedures
constitutes evidence against the claim that a competent speaker’s understanding
of a most statement is exhaustively characterised by a veriﬁcation-agnostic truth
condition.
3. Experiment 1
This experiment is also reported in Pietroski et al. (2008).
3.1. Design and Procedure
On each trial, participants saw a 200ms display containing dots of two colours,
yellow and blue. Participants were asked to judge Most of the dots are yellow true
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seventeen. Whether the yellow set or the blue set was larger (and hence, whether
the correct answer was “true” or “false”) was randomised. Participants answered
“true” or “false” by pressing buttons on a keyboard.
Each trial came from one of nine “bins”, each characterised by a ratio. The
ﬁrst bin contained trials where the ratio of the smaller set to the larger set was close
to 1:2; the second bin contained trials where the ratio was close to 2:3; and the
remainingbins contained trials closeto 3:4, 4:5, ..., 9:10. Each participants received
tentrialsin each binforeach ofthreeconditions: Scattered Random, Scattered Pairs
and Column Pairs. The total number of trials for each participant was therefore 9
ratios   3 conditions   10 trials = 270. These were presented in randomised order.
On Scattered Random trials, all the dots (yellow and blue) were scattered
randomly throughout the display. See Figure 6a. In the other two conditions, dots
were displayed in some way intuitively amenable to a one-to-one correspondence-
based veriﬁcation procedure, with yellow dots and blue dots occurring in pairs.
On Scattered Pairs trials, every dot from the smaller set was displayed paired with
(approximately four pixels away from) a dot from the larger set, and the remaining
dots from the larger set were scattered randomly. See Figure 6b. On Column Pairs
trials, dots were arranged in a grid with two columns and n rows, where n is the size
of the larger set. Each row had either one dot from each set or a single dot from
the larger set, with the position (left column or right column) of each dot chosen
randomly for each row. See Figure 6c.
a.
b. c.
Figure 6: Sample stimuli from Experiment 1, from each condition: Scattered Ran-
dom (a), Scattered Pairs (b) and Column Pairs (c).
Half of the trials for each condition were “area-controlled”: individual dot
sizes varied, but the number of yellow pixels was equal to the number of blue pixels
(that is, the average yellow dot was smaller than the average blue dot whenever
there were more yellow dots than blue dots). This prevented using the total area
covered by a colour as a proxy for set cardinality. The other half of the trials for
each condition for each ratio were “size-controlled”: while individual dot sizes
varied, the size of the average yellow dot was equal to the size of the average blue
dot, so the set with more dots would also have a larger total area on the screen
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than blue dots). This avoided confounding average dot size with set cardinality,
because if all trials were area-controlled then one could determine the set with the
larger cardinality by comparing dot sizes across colours. On both area-controlled
and size-controlled trials, individual dot sizes varied randomly by up to 35% of the
set average, such that dots of the same colour were not all of the same size (see
Figure 6).
3.2. Predictions
We can identify three distinct hypotheses about the veriﬁcation procedures used by
participants. The 200ms display time does not permit veriﬁcation procedures based
on explicit counting, ruling out cardinality-based procedures (8a).
Firstly, participants might use one-to-one correspondence-based procedures
(8b)onall trials. In thiscase wepredictresponses tobeaffected by dotlayout(more
accurate on Scattered Pairs and/or Column Pairs trials than on Scattered Random
trials), but unaffected by ratio.
Secondly, participants might use ANS-based procedures (8c) on all trials.
In this case we predict responses to be affected by ratio (more accurate on “easy”
ratios like 1:2 and 2:3 than on “hard” ratios like 8:9 and 9:10), but unaffected by
dot layout.
Thirdly, participants might adopt the most suitable veriﬁcation procedure
for each individual trial. In this case we predict responses to be affected by both
ratio and dot layout. Broadly speaking, accuracy should be higher on trials that use
the pairing layouts or use easy ratios; in either case, participants should be able to
adopt a veriﬁcation procedure which takes advantage of the display’s properties.
Of course, these predictions rely on the assumption that the Scattered Pairs
and Column Pairs trials do in fact permit the detection of the relevant one-to-one
correspondences within the 200ms display time. Control experiments using iden-
tical stimuli have shown that the 200ms display time is sufﬁcient to detect these
one-to-one correspondences and identify the uniform colour of the remaining dots
(Halberda et al. 2007). Nothing inherent to the stimuli, then, can be preventing par-
ticipants from using correspondence-based veriﬁcation procedures; if they do not
do so, there must be another reason.
3.3. Results and Discussion
Percentage of correct responses for each participant was entered into a 3 condition
(Scattered Random, Scattered Pairs, Column Pairs)   2 trial type (size-controlled,
area-controlled)   9 ratio Repeated Measures ANOVA. There was a signiﬁcant
effect of ratio, as participants did better with easier ratios (F(8,80) = 14.603,p <
0.001), and no signiﬁcant effect of condition (F(2,20) = 0.215,p = 0.808). This
pattern of results can be seen in Figure 7. There was also no signiﬁcant effect of
trial type (F(1,10) = 3.187,p = 0.105), indicating that participants relied on the
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number, so performance has been collapsed across trial type in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Percentage of responses correct for each trial type as a function of ratio.
The ratio referred to as 1:2 in the main text appears at 2 on the x-axis; the ratio
referred to as 9:10 appears at 10
9   1.11.
These results favour the second hypothesis presented in Section 3.2, on
which participants use ANS-based procedures on all trials. Their performance im-
proved as the ratio of yellow dots to non-yellow dots became less “even” (further
from 1:1), as predicted by the ratio-dependence of ANS comparisons, but did not
improve (or change at all) when dots were presented in obvious pairs.
Furthermore, the particularpattern ofimprovementas theratios became less
“even” — that is, the particular shape of the upward trend in Figure 7 — matched
the function predicted by the standard model of the psychophysics of the ANS ex-
tremely closely. If we suppose that a participant’s representation of the cardinality
of a set of n1 dots is a Gaussian curve with mean n1 and standard deviation wn1,
and thus that the representation for n2 dots is a Gaussian curve with mean n2 and
standard deviation wn2, then the standard model predicts that the probability of the
participant judging n2 to be greater than n1 is determined by the curve represent-
ing the difference between these two random variables: the Gaussian curve with
mean (n2  n1) and standard deviation w
 
n2
1+n2
2 (Pica et al. 2004). (Here w is
a constant characterising the acuity of this particular individual’s ANS, called the
“internal Weber fraction”.) In particular, the probability of n2 being judged greater
than n1 is the proportion of the area under this curve to the right of zero (because
this is the probability of (n2 n1) being judged greater than zero), as given by the
following formula:
(9) Pr(n2 judged greater than n1) = 1
2 erfc
 
  n1 n2
 
2w
 
n2
1+n2
2
 
 
Thereforeforeachvalueofw, themodeldeterminesafunctionmappingWeberratio
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for each condition such that this function matches the results extremely closely.5
See Figure 8 and Table 1.6 This constitutes strong evidence that participants used
ANS-based veriﬁcation procedures, and not any other veriﬁcation procedure which
would show improved accuracy with less evenly-matched ratios.7
Condition Correlation (R2) Internal Weber Fraction (w)
Scattered Random 0.9677 0.32
Scattered Pairs 0.8642 0.33
Column Pairs 0.9364 0.30
Table 1: The high values of R2 (close to 1) indicate a high correlation between the
predictions of the ANS model, for the given value of the internal Weber fraction
(w), and the pattern of results for each condition.
At least as importantly from a linguistic point of view, however, as telling
us which particular veriﬁcation procedure was used, these results suggest that the
choice of which veriﬁcation procedure to use is not as unconstrained as one might
have thought. Participants did not adopt the most suitable veriﬁcation procedure
4While the formula in (9) is expressed in terms of n1 and n2 (and w), the result is uniquely
determined by the ratio of n1 to n2 (and w):
n1 n2
 
2w
 
n2
1+n2
2
=
1
n2(n1 n2)
 
2w 1
n2
 
n2
1+n2
2
=
n1
n2  1
 
2w
  
n1
n2
 2
+1
5Typical values for w in a task where participants are asked to directly judge the truth of a
sentence like There are more yellow dots than blue dots are around 0.14 (Pica et al. 2004), so
our participants’ accuracy in verifying Most of the dots are yellow is poorer — their performance
showed the signature of a system with w   0.3, meaning larger standard deviations and thus noisier
representations. Further research is required to determine exactly why this is, although Experiment
2 will suggest one possibility.
6The curve for the Scattered Random condition falls slightly below that of Scattered Pairs be-
causeofa slighttendencyforparticipantsto guessrandomlyonsometrials ( 6%ineachcondition).
Given the size of the standard errors for each condition (see Figure 7), the estimated value of w for
each condition — and therefore the predicted curve for each condition — should be considered
statistically indistinguishable from the others.
7In particular, this tells against the hypothesis that participants’ understanding of most required
them to verify a stricter truth condition than that assumed in this paper, something along the lines
of “signiﬁcantly more than half” of the dots being yellow. Since the graph in Figure 7 shows the
percentage of responses which agreed with the condition |DOT YELLOW| > |DOT YELLOW|,
a veriﬁcation procedure for a stricter “signiﬁcantly more” truth condition would also show “poor
accuracy” for ratios close to 1:1, because this is where (the truth values determined by) the two
truth conditions diverge. But the responses closely matched the function predicted by the model
on the assumption that participants were attempting to verify the truth of |DOT YELLOW| >
|DOT YELLOW|, as opposed to any other truth condition; note that the curves in Figure 8 predict
better than chance accuracy for Weber ratios even slightly above 1. For further elaboration of this
point, and other evidence against the “signiﬁcantly more than half” hypothesis, see Pietroski et al.
(2008).
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predictions of the standard model of ANS performance (as curves).
for each individual trial, as the third hypothesis in Section 3.2 suggests: in the Scat-
tered Pairs and Column Pairs conditions, where the fact that the yellow dots and the
non-yellow dots were in the OneToOnePlus relation was made obvious (and per-
ceptible by participants in our control studies (Halberda et al. 2007)), participants
showed exactly the same ANS-based pattern of responses as in the Scattered Ran-
dom condition. Speakers’ reluctance to take advantage of the pairing of dots in the
display is unexplained if the meaning of the sentence Most of the dots are yellow is
a veriﬁcation-agnostic truth condition. It is more consistent with the view that the
meaning of a sentence comes with some bias towards certain kinds of veriﬁcation
procedures.
In beginning to describe the precise nature of this bias, we can tread only
very carefully. Clearly we do not want to deny that a sentence like Most of the
dots are yellow can be veriﬁed using procedures which are not ANS-based. If pre-
sented with a Scattered Random display with a “hard” ratio (say, ten yellow dots
and nine non-yellow dots) for an unlimited amount of time, a speaker would prob-
ably determine the truth of the sentence by counting dots and comparing precise
cardinalities (8a), never making use of the ANS at all. Even if the only information
provided about a scene is that the yellow dots and the non-yellow dots are in the
OneToOnePlus relation, a speaker may well be able to determine that the sentence
is true (8b). But the results of this experiment suggest that there is at least some
asymmetry between the range of possible procedures; that the ANS-based proce-
dures, despite being less accurate, are in some sense more directly available for
veriﬁcation of a most sentence than correspondence-based procedures. For more
detailed discussion of the nature of this asymmetry, see Pietroski et al. (2008).
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The results from Experiment 1 indicate that participants used ANS representations
to perform some stochastic version of the comparison indicated in this expression
of the relevant truth condition:
(10) |DOT YELLOW| > |DOT YELLOW|
We can now ask more detailed questions about exactly how this comparison is car-
ried out. In particular, we focus on the (approximate) representation of the cardi-
nality |DOT YELLOW|.
To investigate more closely how a representation of this cardinality is con-
structed, we need to turn to displays containing dots of more than two colours. We
can identify two distinct procedures which could in principle be used in this sce-
nario to construct a representation of the numerosity of the non-yellow dots. The
ﬁrst, the Subtraction Procedure, involves attending to the “superset” containing
all dots, attending to the set of yellow dots, and performing a subtraction on the two
generated ANS representations. The second, the Selection Procedure, involves
attending to each of the non-yellow colour sets individually, and summing the rep-
resentations of the cardinalities of these sets in cases where there is more than one
non-yellow colour present.
However, some constraints on the parallel visual perception of sets have
been identiﬁed that bear on the psychological plausibility of these two procedures.
Halberda et al. (2006) found that when adults are brieﬂy presented with a scene
containing dots of between two and six colours, they can use the ANS to estimate
the cardinality of up to three sets in parallel. One of these is necessarily the “super-
set” containingall the dotsin thedisplay, so this amountsto a constraint that at most
two subsets can be selected. The property of having a particular colour is a salient
“early visual feature” (Treisman and Gormican 1988), so one can, for example, at-
tend to all the yellow dots and construct an ANS representation of the cardinality
of this set (Halberda et al. 2006). However, it is not possible to select dots on the
basis of a disjunction or negation of such properties (Wolfe 1998). So one can not,
in a scene with, say, yellow dots as well as dots of four other colours, atomically
attend to the set of all non-yellow dots — this would require selecting dots on the
basis of a disjunction like “red or blue or ...”, or the negation “not yellow”. In sum-
mary, when brieﬂy presented with an array of dots of a number of different colours,
humans can generate (at most) three ANS representations: ﬁrstly, one for the set of
all dots present; secondly, one for the set of dots of a particular colour, say, yellow;
and thirdly, one for the set of dots of another colour, say, blue.
We therefore know that the Subtraction Procedure is psychologically plau-
sible, no matter how many non-yellow colours are present, because it only requires
two ANS representations to be generated from the visual stimulus: one for the “su-
perset” of all dots, and one for the set of yellow dots. The Selection Procedure
is plausible in cases where there is only one non-yellow colour present, say, blue,
because it is sufﬁcient to attend to the set of blue dots and the set of yellow dots
(in addition to the “superset”). In cases with more than one non-yellow colour
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require attending to more than two colour subsets of the display (in addition to the
“superset”): the set of yellow dots, and more than one non-yellow colour set.
There is another signiﬁcant distinction between these two veriﬁcation pro-
cedures. In cases where it is possible to use the Selection Procedure (that is, when
there are only two colours of dots present), it will give more accurate results than
the Subtraction Procedure. This is because in these cases the representation of
|DOT YELLOW| is atomically detected by the Selection Procedure, but is com-
puted indirectly by the Subtraction Procedure. Therefore the noise inherent to ANS
representations is magniﬁed by the use of the Subtraction Procedure.
The combined implications of varying the number of non-yellow colours
present in a display for the two veriﬁcation procedures considered here are sum-
marised in Table 2.
Number of colours present 2 3 4 5
Subtraction Procedure good good good good
Selection Procedure better impossible impossible impossible
Table 2: The effects of varying the number of non-yellow colours present in a scene
on two possible procedures for verifying the statement Most of the dots are yellow.
5. Experiment 2
This experiment is also reported in Lidz et al. (2008).
5.1. Design and Procedure
On each trial, participants saw a 150ms display containing dots of at least two
colours and at most ﬁve colours (chosen from yellow, blue, red, green, cyan, ma-
genta). Yellow dots were present on every trial.8 Participants were asked to judge
Most of the dots are yellow true or false for each trial. The number of yellow dots
and the number of non-yellow dots varied between ﬁve and seventeen. Whether the
yellow set or the non-yellow set was larger (and hence, whether the correct answer
was “true” or “false”) was randomised. Participants answered “true” or “false” by
pressing buttons on a keyboard.
Within each of the four conditions (two to ﬁve colours), the ratio of the
cardinality of the smaller set (yellow or non-yellow) to that of the larger set ranged
over 1:2, 2:3, 3:4, 5:6 and 7:8 (a subset of the ratios used in Experiment 1). Each
participant received ﬁfteen trials in each ratio bin for each of the four conditions.
The total number of trials for each participant was therefore 5 ratios   4 conditions
  15 trials = 300. These were presented in randomised order.
8For irrelevant technical reasons, the target colour was actually blue in this experiment rather
than yellow as in Experiment 1. We abstract away from this change for ease of exposition.
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sizesvaried, butthenumberofyellowpixelswasequaltothenumberofnon-yellow,
non-background pixels (that is, the average yellow dot was smaller than the average
non-yellow dot whenever there were more yellow dots than non-yellow dots). This
prevented using the total area covered by a colour as a proxy for set cardinality.
The other half of the trials for each condition for each ratio were “size-controlled”:
while individual dot sizes varied, the size of the average yellow dot was equal to
the size of the average non-yellow dot, so the set with more dots would also have
a larger total area on the screen (that is, more yellow pixels than non-yellow, non-
background pixels whenever there were more yellow dots than non-yellow dots).
This avoided confounding average dot size with set cardinality, because if all trials
were area-controlled then one could determine the set with the larger cardinality
by comparing dot sizes across colours. On both area-controlled and size-controlled
trials, individual dot sizes varied randomly by up to 35% of the set average, such
that dots from the same set were not all of the same size.
5.2. Predictions
We can identify three distinct hypotheses about the veriﬁcation procedures used
by participants. Note that we can expect responses on two-colour trials to pattern
identically to those in Experiment 1, and so the hypotheses diverge only in their
predictions of how this pattern will or will not change as the number of colours in
the display increases.
Firstly, participants might use the Subtraction Procedure on all trials. In this
case we predict responses to be unaffected by the number of colours in the display,
and pattern identically to those in Experiment 1 throughout.
Secondly, participants might use the Selection Procedure on all trials. In
this case we predict responses to be at chance when the number of colours present
is greater than two, because this veriﬁcation procedure fails.
Thirdly, participants might adopt the most suitable veriﬁcation procedure
for each individual trial. In this case the Selection Procedure will be used on two-
colour trials and the Subtraction Procedure elsewhere, so accuracy on trials with
more than two colours should be above chance but lower than accuracy on two-
colour trials.
5.3. Results and Discussion
Percentage of correct responses for each participant was entered into a 4 condi-
tion (2, 3, 4, 5 colours)   2 trial type (size-controlled, area-controlled)   5 ratio
Repeated Measures ANOVA. There was a signiﬁcant effect of ratio, as participants
didbetterwith easierratios(F(4,44)=109.092, p<0.001), and no effect ofcondi-
tion (numberof colours in the stimulus)(F(3,33)=7.326, p=0.842). This pattern
of results can be seen in Figure 9. As in Figure 7, we have collapsed across trial
type to construct this graph; though here there was a marginal effect of trial type, as
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(F(1,11) = 7.326, p < 0.05).
Figure 9: Percentage of responses correct for each trial type as a function of ratio.
The ratio referred to as 1:2 in the main text appears at 2 on the x-axis; the ratio
referred to as 7:8 appears at 8
7   1.14.
These results favour the ﬁrst hypothesis presented in Section 5.2, on which
participants use the Subtraction Procedure on all trials. Participants’ responses
showed the same pattern as in Experiment 1 in all conditions, indicating that one
veriﬁcation procedure is used throughout which is impervious to the heterogeneity
(or otherwise) of the non-yellow dots.
Furthermore, the results again matched those predicted by the standard psy-
chophysicalmodel oftheANS extremely closely, as shownin Table 3. Notethat the
estimations of internal Weber fraction (w) are close to those in Experiment 1 in all
four conditions, around 0.3 (see Table 1). If the more accurate Selection Procedure
had been used on two-colour trials, we would have expected a signiﬁcantly lower
value for w in the two-colour condition than in the other three conditions, indicating
a less noisy computation.9
As in Experiment 1, we have not only identiﬁed which particular veriﬁca-
tion procedure was used, but also found more evidence that the choice of veriﬁ-
cation procedure is not as unconstrained as a truth-conditional theory of sentence
meanings would predict. Participants did not adopt the most suitable veriﬁcation
procedure for each individual trial, as the third hypothesis in Section 5.2 suggests:
accuracy was no better in the two-colour trials than in other trials, indicating that
participants did not use the Selection Procedure even when it was psychologically
9The use of the Subtraction Procedure provides one possible explanation for the relatively high
values of w; see footnote 5. If participants had been using the Selection Procedure, they would
have presumably been carrying out a procedure equivalent to that of the There are more yellow dots
than blue dots task in which a value of w around 0.14 is typically found. Indeed, one might have
considered the high value of w in Experiment 1 to be evidence that the Subtraction Procedure was
being used there, even before the ﬁndings of Experiment 2 showed the same accuracy with more
colours present.
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2 Colours Present 0.9480 0.29
3 Colours Present 0.9586 0.32
4 Colours Present 0.9813 0.28
5 Colours Present 0.9625 0.32
Table 3: The high values of R2 (close to 1) indicate a high correlation between the
predictions of the ANS model, for the given value of the internal Weber fraction
(w), and the pattern of results for each condition.
feasible, despite its being more accurate than the alternative Subtraction Procedure.
Not only the does meaning of Most of the dots are yellow appear to have a bias to-
wards ANS-based veriﬁcation procedures over correspondence-based procedures,
but even within the range of ANS-based procedures that would compute the appro-
priate truth condition (albeit stochastically)there appear to be asymmetries. Partici-
pants insisted on approximating the cardinality of the set of non-yellow dots as “the
dots minus theyellow dots”, despitethe availabilityof a more direct and moreaccu-
rate alternative procedure, suggesting that the subtraction sign in the conventional
expression of the relevant truth condition should be taken to carry some “veriﬁca-
tional weight”. Subtleties abound here concerning the exact nature of this “veriﬁca-
tional weight”, given the relationship between set subtraction and cardinality sub-
tractionandtheequivalenceof|DOT YELLOW|and |DOT (DOT YELLOW)|
and |DOT YELLOW|; for more detailed discussion see Lidz et al. (2008). But the
main point is that no asymmetry between veriﬁcation procedures at all is predicted
if sentence meanings are veriﬁcation-agnostic truth conditions, unstructured func-
tions from worlds to truth values.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have argued against the claim that a competent speaker’s under-
standing of a sentence is exhaustively characterised by a truth condition. To do so
we have presented evidence of asymmetries in speakers’ willingness to use vari-
ous veriﬁcation procedures: in Experiment 1, an apparent bias to use algorithms
approximating a cardinality comparison rather than those based on one-to-one cor-
respondence, and in Experiment 2, an insistence on an indirect method of approxi-
mation. These asymmetries would be surprising if the only constraint on the choice
of veriﬁcation procedures for a sentence was the requirement that the procedure
must implement the sentence’s truth condition.
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